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1. INTRODUCTION
The long version of Siegel’s paper is an extremely useful overview of the literature
on two aspects of the epistemology of disagreement, and I’m in complete agreement
with what I take to be his main conclusions, namely
(1)

(2)

that because of ambiguities in the treatment of peerhood and the
variety of different cases which require different sorts of treatment,
there do not seem to be any general epistemic principles concerning
peer disagreement, other than what has come to be called the Total
Evidence View, and
that Fogelin is wrong in supposing or concluding that that there are
disagreements “which by their nature are not subject to rational
resolution.”

I would however call brief attention to two aspects of Siegel’s presentation about
which I have reservations.
2. CRITICIZING FOGELIN’S VIEW
After an illuminating summary of Fogelin’s (1985/2005) paper, Siegel reviews and
endorses the criticisms of that paper offered by Andrew Lugg (1986) and Feldman
(2005) – criticisms (especially Lugg’s) which seem to me to be on target. But Siegel
thinks that Lugg’s observations don’t “cut to the heart of the matter …, in that they
do not engage Fogelin’s Wittgensteinian epistemological stance.” Moreover Siegel
suggests that in order to establish that Feldman is right in his criticisms and Fogelin
wrong, “we must pay more explicit attention to the Wittgensteinian epistemological
views that drive Fogelin’s account of deep disagreement.”
However, I’m not enthusiastic about Siegel’s resting his case on the criticism he
mounts of Wittgenstein.1 Though Fogelin (1985/2005) does in fact invoke themes
from Wittgenstein 1969 (On Certainty) along the way,
I should add that there are a host of things in On Certainty with which I disagree. However, that
essay is a complicated (if not messy) piece, and whether it “works” as what it is (an attempt to
1
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(a)
(b)

I’m not sure that Wittgenstein’s views are all that essential to what
Fogelin is trying to say2 and
I fear that centering the criticism of Wittgenstein’s “argument” for his
view on Prichard’s (2011) reconstruction invites too many quibbles
about the adequacy of that reconstruction.

3. ON WHAT IS AT STAKE IN PEER DISAGREEMENT
In exploring the issue of peer disagreement, Siegel accepts the terms in which that
issue is discussed in the literature devoted to it – treating it as an issue of whether
and when we should continue to believe a given proposition in the face of peer
disagreement and whether or when we should alter our confidence in a proposition
in the face of disagreement about its truth. Given that Siegel is attempting to assess
what light that literature throws on the issue, accepting the terms in which it is
usually discussed is entirely appropriate.
From my perspective, however, it is a serious flaw in those discussions and in
epistemology generally, to conceptualize the cognitive attitudes available to us
simply in terms of belief and degrees of confidence. I continue to embrace (see for
example Pinto, 2006, 2007, 2009 and 2010) a qualitative version of evidence
proportionalism which recognizes a variety of qualitatively distinct cognitive and
non-cognitive attitudes, type-identified by their functional roles in our mental life. In
that view, whether it is reasonable for an individual to adopt one or another such
attitude toward a given propositional content will depend (at least in part) on the
evidence available to that individual.
Consider, for example, the question of what attitude we ought to take toward the
best of our scientific theories concerning a particular domain. Given the reasonable
expectation that any one of our current scientific theories is likely to be superseded
by a better (more accurate and perhaps quite different) theory at some point in the
future, a wise person would not adopt an attitude of outright or unqualified belief in
that theory. Nor should she or he be confident but less than certain that that theory
is true. What such a theory offers is our currently best way of understanding the
domain to which it applies – and one way or another our cognitive attitude toward
that theory should reflect that fact.
Recognizing that there are cognitive attitudes not captured by the concepts of belief,
lack thereof, or some degree of confidence may turn out to be important in deciding
how I ought to modify my attitude toward something I believe when I discover that
a thoughtful and informed person denies it. Surely that discovery should affect my
attitude, but the reasonable initial response it might be to treat it as something I
have strong reason to believe but which is in dispute. Suppose I learn the other’s
criticize Moore’s approach to skepticism) has little or no bearing on Fogelin’s claim that deep
disagreements are by their nature not subject to rational resolution.
It’s worth noting that Fogelin (2005, p. 9) takes exception to what may be Wittgenstein’s own use of
the concept of “form of life”, and that in the crucial last 4 paragraphs of the 1985/2005 paper leading
up to the final sentence in which Fogelin claims that deep disagreements are “by their nature not
subject to rational resolution” Wittgensteinian notions aren’t appealed.
2

2

reasons for denying it and can’t put my finger on anything wrong with those
reasons. But suppose I know I often fail to see error’s in complicated reasoning. In
that case, my reasonable final response might be to treat it as something I have
strong reason to believe and which others appear to have strong reasons to reject.
Another useful distinction applicable to cognitive attitudes is that between doxastic
or belief-like attitudes (being certain, expecting, presuming, suspecting, doubting,
rejecting) and what L. J. Cohen (1992) has called acceptance.3 Accepting a
proposition (in Cohen’s sense) is being prepared to use it as a premise – and
acceptance turns out to be (unlike belief) relative to context: we may be prepared to
use a proposition as a premise in one context, but not another, and do so without
“changing our mind”. Often, I suspect, the upshot of fully informed peer
disagreement about a proposition p will be joint doxastic agnosticism about p. But
that still leaves open the question of whether, for certain purposes, I should employ
p as a premiss.
Acceptance of a proposition is or at least can be context-relative, because it can be
conditioned by and contingent upon the following sorts of factor:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

the purposes for which we’re reasoning in a given context,
the practical implications of reaching a false conclusion in that
context,
the cost of failing to reach a conclusion in that context, and
the relative costs of various ways of reaching a conclusion in that
context.

Whether it is reasonable for an individual to accept a proposition on a given
occasion depends on contextual factors because it is sensitive these four sorts of
factor. And as I have pointed out on another occasion (Pinto, 2003), assessing the
practical implications and relative costs of accepting of failing to accept conclusion
will often depend on an assessor’s nonepistemic values. In light of this latter fact, it
should be easy to see how peer disagreement that leads or ought to lead to doxastic
agnosticism could well lead to reasonable peer disagreement about whether a
proposition should be accepted.
4. CONCLUSION
In short, I believe that the entire matter of peer disagreement needs to be rethought
in terms of a more sophisticated and more realistic account of the cognitive
attitudes that are at stake.

3

Akin to what Bratman (1999, ch. 2) has called taking for granted.
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